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In thisopinionarticle, I summarizetheso-
called “mad genius” debate and suggest a
way to reframe the issue so that it can ben-
eﬁt the ﬁeld rather than divide it. As others
have pointed out, creativity cannot effec-
tively be studied as an overarching entity;
it must be broken into smaller pieces and
studiedfromanindividualdifferencesper-
spective in order to provide meaningful
results relating to brain function. I also
try to frame the infant ﬁeld of creativity-
psychopathology neuroscience, and I end
with the beneﬁts this area of inquiry will
provide.
THE “MAD GENIUS” DEBATE
Creativity has been described as a human
survival mechanism that allows both the
individual and the species to adapt to the
environment in real time (Richards, 1999;
Miller, 2001). Creativity is also a sought-
after character trait in ﬁelds as diverse as
business, the arts, science, and sports. And
yet we ﬁnd there is a long list of high-level
creative achievers who have suffered from
theinnerdemonsofpsychopathology.The
list includes such contemporary luminar-
ies as comedian Robin Williams, as well as
a host of inﬂuential creators from the past:
Vincent Van Gogh, Robert Schumann,
Mozart, Beethoven, Sylvia Plath, Virginia
Woolf, Anne Sexton, Ernest Hemingway,
Edgar Allan Poe, Michelangelo, Georgia
O’Keefe, and Jackson Pollock, to name
only a few (Jamison, 1993). Mentions
of a connection between creativity and
madness extend back at least as far as
Aristotle and Plato (Becker, 2000-2001).
These anecdotal examples appear to con-
tradict the beliefs that creativity is adap-
tive for the individual and is, as suggested
by some (e.g., Maslow, 1968; Dietrich,
2014), a manifestation of positive mental
health.
In addition to anecdotal examples, we
see a growing body of empirical studies
associatingcreativitywithvariousformsof
psychopathology, including mood disor-
ders (for reviews, see Johnson et al., 2012;
Kaufmann and Kaufmann, 2014), schizo-
typal thinking (for a review, see Barrantes-
Vidal, 2014), alcohol abuse (Andreasen,
1987; Dardis, 1989; Ludwig, 1990, 1992;
Post, 1994), and more recently ADHD
(Healey and Rucklidge, 2006; Healey,
2014) and autism (Pring et al., 2012).
These studies appear to indicate that
highly creative individuals are at greater
risk for certain disorders than are mem-
bers of the general public. However, more
nuanced research suggests that individ-
uals with small doses of psychopathol-
ogy, such as those who exhibit low-level
symptoms or who have inherited part—
but not all—of a pathological genotype,
a r em o r el i k e l yt ob ec r e a t i v et h a ne i t h e r
their mentally healthy counterparts or
those with full-blown disorder (Heston,
1966; Karlsson, 1970; Richards et al.,
1988; Kinney et al., 2000-2001; Abraham,
2014; Simonton, 2014). This is often
referred to as the “inverted U” model
(Richards et al., 1988), or what I call
a “dose-dependent” relationship (Carson,
2013), of creativity and psychopathol-
ogy.
Many (perhaps most) of these stud-
ies which have found an association
between creativity and psychopathology
have been criticized for methodologi-
cal deﬁcits which question their valid-
ity (see Schlesinger, 2009; Sawyer, 2012;
Dietrich, 2014). And so we have a
“mad genius” debate, with one side
suggesting that elements of mental ill-
ness may enhance creativity (at least
in small doses) and the other side
suggesting that the correlation between
creativity and psychopathology is unsup-
ported and that virtually all the studies
that claim a connection are riddled with
methodological errors.
REFRAMING THE DEBATE
This debate, while divisive, may lead
to important advances in the neuro-
science of creativity because it calls atten-
t i o nt ot w op r o b l e m st h a tn e e dt ob e
addressed: ﬁrst the presence (ﬂawed stud-
ies not withstanding) of a host of cre-
ative individuals with psychopathology,
and second, the need for methodolog-
i c a lr i g o rw h e ni n v e s t i g a t i n gt h ec r e -
ativity/psychopathology connection. The
World Health Organization estimates that
450 million people world-wide suffer
from mental disorders (World Health
Organization, 2013). Even if rates of psy-
chopathology are actually lower among
highly creative individuals than in the gen-
eral population (and we don’t currently
have a body of research that corrobo-
rates this), it is still the case that there
are a great many individuals (likely mil-
lions) who are both creative and who have
mental disorders. The question within the
ﬁeld of neuroscience then should not be
whether creative individuals are at greater
risk for madness than the general popu-
lation; it should be whether creativity and
the creative process are different in the dis-
o r d e r e db r a i nt h a ni nt h en o n - d i s o r d e r e d
brain.
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Given the importance of creative
thought to human survival, it is likely that
t h r o u g h o u tt h ec o u r s eo fe v o l u t i o nw e
have developed a variety of biologically-
based strategies to help us solve ill-deﬁned
problems creatively (see Jung, 2014). What
we refer to as “creativity” is actually a col-
lection of these strategies rather than a
single process or entity. Several of these
strategies include visualizing outcomes of
an action (mental imagery), generating
multiple (both original and mundane)
solutions to a prompt (divergent think-
ing), consciously making comparisons of
between two disparate concepts or objects
(metaphoricalthinking),andputtingaside
a problem to allow it to incubate until a
solution suddenly arrives (insight). Each
of these strategies can be further bro-
ken down into component processes,
some of which utilize brain networks that
are already understood in terms of their
underlying neuroscience. For example, we
know that mental imagery utilizes much
ofthesamecircuitry thatisusedtoprocess
ordinary vision (Kosslyn et al., 2006). By
continuing to study creativity as ifit were a
single entity, and by expecting that all sub-
jects will engage similar neural circuits to
solve creative tasks, we will only continue
to generate conﬂicting and inconsistent
ﬁndings (Arden et al., 2010; Dietrich and
Kanso, 2010). However, by (1) parsing cre-
ativity into smaller components based on
cognitive processes (e.g., Abraham, 2013),
and(2)lookingatneuralcreativeprocesses
through the lens of an individual differ-
ences approach (including differences in
predisposition for psychopathology) we
can eliminate much of the confusion and
contradictory results in the ﬁeld.
A NEUROSCIENCE OF
CREATIVITY-PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
Individuals with a predisposition to men-
tal disorder may utilize different strate-
gies, or they may use familiar strategies in
unusual ways, to solve creative tasks. For
overacentury,knowledgeofpsychopatho-
logical states in the brain has illuminated
our knowledge of normal brain states,
and that should also be the case with the
study of the creative brain. Neuroscience
can approach this study in two ways.
First, it can identify genetic variations
that may underlie both creativity and
psychopathology. This molecular biology
approach is already underway, with sev-
eral studies indicating polymorphisms of
the DRD2 and DRD4 genes (Reuter et al.,
2006; Mayseless et al., 2013), the 5HT2a
gene (Ott et al., 2005)a n dt h eN R G 1g e n e
(Kéri,2009)thathavebeenassociated with
both creativity and certain forms of psy-
chopathology.
Second, brain imaging work can be
applied to the study of the cognitive mech-
anisms that may be commonly shared
between creativity and psychopathology.
For example, psychologists have long sug-
gested that both schizotypal and highly
creative individuals tend to utilize states of
cognitive disinhibition to access associa-
tions that are ordinarily hidden from con-
sciousawareness(e.g.,Kris,1952;Koestler,
1964; Eysenck, 1995). Research is revealing
that indeed both highly creative subjects
and subjects who are high in schizotypy
demonstrate more disinhibition dur-
ing creative tasks than less creative or
less schizotypal subjects (see Martindale,
1999; Carson et al., 2003; Abraham and
Windmann, 2008; Dorfman et al., 2008).
However, the neural substrates of cogni-
tive disinhibition, as applied to creativity,
need to be further studied.
My colleagues and I have found that
cognitive disinhibition (in the form of
reduced latent inhibition) combined with
very high IQ levels predicts extraordinary
creative achievement (Carson et al., 2003).
These results have since been replicated
(Kéri, 2011). We hypothesized that cog-
nitive disinhibition allows a broadening
of stimuli available to consciousness while
high IQ affords the cognitive resources
FIGURE 1 | Shared vulnerability model of creativity and psychopathology (adapted from
Carson, 2011).
to process and manipulate that increased
stimuli to form novel and creative ideas
without the individual becoming over-
whelmed and confused. What we did not
test is whether the high creative achievers
in our studies exhibited phasic changes in
latent inhibition, or whether their reduced
inhibition was more trait-like, as is seen
in persons at risk for psychosis. Because
latent inhibition tasks are compatible with
neuroimaging,thestudyofcontrolledcog-
nitive disinhibition is one area of potential
study for the neuroscience of creativity.
Additional areas of study are sug-
gestedbythesharedvulnerabilitymodelof
creativity and psychopathology (Carson,
2011, 2013). The shared vulnerabil-
ity model suggests that creativity and
psychopathology may share genetically-
inﬂuenced factors that are expressed as
either pathology or creativity depending
upon the presence or absence of other
moderating factors (see Figure 1). The
shared vulnerability components that have
been identiﬁed, in addition to cognitive
disinhibition, include novelty salience,
neural hyperconnectivity, and emotional
lability.
Novelty salience is associated with the
motivation to explore novel aspects of
ideas or objects via the dopamine reward
system. Novelty-seeking is associated with
creative personality (McCrae, 1993; Reuter
et al., 1995), creative drive (Flaherty,
2005), alcohol abuse and addiction (Frye
and Salloum, 2006; Grucza et al., 2006),
and with bipolar states of hypomania and
mania (Minassian et al., 2011). Brain
imaging studies can determine whether
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reward areas (such as the ventral striatum)
are more active during creative tasks in
individuals who score high (rather than
low) on measures of creative achieve-
ment as well as in subjects who score
high on scales of hypomania. Brain imag-
ing studies can also investigate whether
activation of reward areas and other neu-
r a ln e t w o r k sv a r i e sd u r i n gc r e a t i v ep r o b -
lem solving with the amount of alcohol
ingestion.
Neural hyperconnectivity is charac-
t e r i z e db ya na b n o r m a ln e u r a ll i n k i n go f
brain areas that are not typically func-
tionally connected. Hyperconnectivity
is linked to bizarre associations in
schizophrenia (Whitﬁeld-Gabrieli et al.,
2009), and has also been noted in bipo-
lar individuals (McCrea, 2008). Brain
imaging studies detect more alpha syn-
chronization, both within and across
hemispheres, in the brains of high cre-
ative vs. less creative subjects, suggesting,
perhaps, unusual connectivity (Fink and
Benedek, 2014). The exploration of neural
connectivity in creative but schizotypal
individuals may shed light on the creation
of remote associations.
Mood lability is a characteristic of
mood disorders. Changes in mood, espe-
cially increases in positive affect, have been
shown to increase divergent thinking in
normal subjects (Ashby et al., 1999), while
highly creative individuals with mood dis-
orders demonstrate patterns of higher
creative productivity during upswings in
mood (Jamison, 1989). However, the neu-
roscience of creativity and mood is not
well-explored and presents a ripe area for
further inquiry.
CONCLUSIONS
The mad genius debate is a polarizing
and divisive issue in the ﬁeld of creativ-
ity research. By reframing this debate as a
question of how individuals with vulner-
ability to psychopathology differ in their
strategies of solving creative tasks from
those who do not display evidence of vul-
n e r a b i l i t i e s ,w ec a nu s et h em a dg e n i u s
issue as an opportunity to promote a sci-
entiﬁc exploration of creativity and psy-
chopathology rather than to polarize the
ﬁeld.
The implications of the mad genius
debate for the neuroscience of creativity
are threefold. First, the debate emphasizes
the need for, and encourages, an individ-
ual difference methodology rather than a
universal one-size-ﬁts-all approach to the
neuroimaging of creative tasks. Individual
differences related to psychopathology,
including self-report measures of schizo-
typy, hypomania, alcohol use, and cre-
ative achievement, can easily be added
to research protocols, and may help
explain conﬂicting ﬁndings in imaging
studies.
Second, studies that target shared vul-
nerabilities related to creativity and psy-
chopathology, as well as non-shared risk
and protective factors, can illuminate the
neural underpinnings of creative cogni-
tion that appear to allow some indi-
viduals at risk for psychopathology to
have a creative edge. Clinicians who treat
creative populations cite high percent-
ages of non-compliance with drug treat-
ment because of the negative effects of
treatment on creativity (Flaherty, 2011).
Imaging studies may aid in determin-
ing which symptoms of psychopathology
are creativity-enhancing and, thus, sug-
gest directions for the development of
symptom-speciﬁc drug and psychological
therapies that will leave creativity in tact
while improving quality of life in those
with associated psychopathology.
Finally, a neuroscience of creativity and
psychopathology may reveal novel strate-
giesofsummoningthemusethatmaythen
beemployedtoassistnon-disorderedindi-
viduals in enhancing their creativity, thus
enriching both their own lives and society
as a whole.
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